Objectives: To describe an outbreak of KPC-2-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae with inter-hospital spread and measures taken to control transmission.
Introduction
Clinically, the most prevalent of the carbapenemases are the Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) enzymes. The bla KPC genes are predominantly plasmid encoded and are frequently associated with the Tn3-type transposon Tn4401 and, in some cases, with particularly successful sequence types (STs) (e.g. K. pneumoniae ST258 and ST11), which has facilitated their rapid dissemination.
1,2 KPC-producing isolates are common in the USA, Colombia, Israel, the Zhejiang province of China and in Greece, where they have been associated with large nosocomial outbreaks. 3 Reports from other European countries are increasing. In 2009, Roche et al. 4 reported the first K. pneumoniae isolate with a KPC enzyme (KPC-2) in Ireland. In 2011, we reported KPC-2 in an Escherichia coli isolate belonging to the pandemic clone ST131. 5 In this paper we describe an outbreak of KPC-2-producing K. pneumoniae with inter-hospital spread and measures taken to control transmission.
Outbreak description
Hospital A is a 412 bed tertiary care centre serving a population of 361000. Affected patients were cared for in four areas of the hospital, the intensive care unit (ICU), the high-dependency unit (HDU) and two surgical wards (1 and 2). Hospital B is a 700 bed tertiary care centre serving 300000 patients per year in another city. Affected patients were cared for in the ICU of hospital B.
The index case of this outbreak was identified on 6 January 2011. Following identification of a second case in the same unit from a central venous catheter (CVC) tip on 24 January, an outbreak was declared (Table 1 ). Prior to this outbreak six cases of colonization or infection with carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) were identified at hospital A between 2009 and 2010 (Table 2) . 4, 5 Stringent infection and prevention control (IPC) measures were implemented, including contact precautions, access restrictions to affected areas, instruction in hand hygiene, audit of hand hygiene compliance and increased frequency of environmental cleaning, including hydrogen peroxide treatment of all affected wards of hospital A. Weekly screening of patients on affected units for carriage of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae and enhanced antimicrobial stewardship were introduced. Screening was also performed on all discharges and transfers from affected wards in hospital A to other hospitals and long-term care facilities during the outbreak.
In January 2011 carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae was identified in a patient in the ICU of hospital B. This patient had recently self-discharged from the HDU of hospital A, but was subsequently admitted to the ICU of hospital B on 24 January 2011. IPC measures similar to those implemented in hospital A were invoked. One further case was identified on screening (Table 1) .
In August 2011 a further isolate of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae was detected in a patient admitted from the community with a record of admission to hospital A during December 2010, when both this patient and the index case were admitted to the same surgical ward. In October 2011 an additional isolate of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae was detected in a patient admitted to a ward implicated in the outbreak.
Methods
In both hospitals A and B, rectal swabs were screened by the CDC protocol for detection of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. and E. coli. Suspect CPE were forwarded to the Antimicrobial Resistance and Microbial Ecology (ARME) Group at the National University of Ireland Galway for further analyses.
Confirmation of carbapenemase production was performed by the modified Hodge method 7 and by a disc synergy test (Rosco Diagnostica, Taastrup, Denmark). The MICs of meropenem, ertapenem and imipenem were determined by Etest. Susceptibility to the following 15 antimicrobial agents was determined by disc diffusion methods: ampicillin (10 mg); cefpodoxime (10 mg); cefotaxime (30 mg); ceftazidime (30 mg); cefoxitin (30 mg); nalidixic acid (30 mg); ciprofloxacin (5 mg); gentamicin (10 mg); kanamycin (30 mg); streptomycin (10 mg); chloramphenicol (30 mg); sulphonamides (250 mg); tetracycline (30 mg); trimethoprim (5 mg); and minocycline (30 mg). Confirmed CPE were tested for the presence of bla VIM , bla IMP , bla GIM , bla SIM , bla SPM , bla KPC , bla OXA-51-like , bla OXA-23-like , bla OXA-40-like , bla OXA-58-like , bla OXA-48 , bla GES and bla NDM by PCR. 8 -11 Analysis of Tn4401 insertion sites was performed by PCR. 12 PFGE was performed on KPC-producing K. pneumoniae using XbaI. Plasmid analysis was performed by S1 nuclease PFGE.
The Antimicrobial Reference Laboratory at HPA UK carried out multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA) at loci A, E, H, J, K, D, N1, N2 and N4. 13 Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was performed on isolates representative of each PFGE type at the Institut Pasteur.
14 Alleles and profiles were determined by comparison with the K. pneumoniae MLST database at www.pasteur.fr/mlst.
Results
The 13 isolates had MICs of meropenem, imipenem and ertapenem of 4 to .32, 8 -32 and .16 mg/L, respectively, were positive by the modified Hodge method and the disc synergy test indicated KPC activity ( Table 2) . Phenotypic results were similar for the additional isolates of K. pneumoniae isolated at hospital A ( Table 2 ). Isolates showed resistance to multiple non-b-lactam agents including ciprofloxacin, but were generally susceptible to streptomycin, gentamicin, colistin and tigecycline.
PCR and sequencing confirmed the presence of bla KPC-2 in all isolates and that this was carried in an isoform 'a' Tn4401 element. Isolates harboured one to four plasmids of 5-191 kb. PFGE analysis of outbreak isolates revealed significant similarities (≥88%) with four distinguishable pulsed-field profiles (PFPs) identified. PFGE analysis of previous isolates indicated that four of these isolates (including the isolate from 2009-isolate number 2028) were very closely related to the outbreak strains (≥88%). The PFP of the isolate detected in August 2011 was indistinguishable from that of a number of the outbreak strains, whereas the isolate identified in October 2011 was similar but distinguishable from the outbreak strains and from isolates detected in 2009 and 2010 (Table 2) . MLVA revealed that representatives of individual PFPs shared the same MLVA profile (3, 2, 2, 14, -, 1, 3, 3, 1). MLST indicated that all isolates belonged to the pandemic sequence type ST258.
Discussion
The capacity of clinical laboratories to detect CPE is fundamental to mapping trends and the detection of CPE outbreaks. Routine testing of isolates of Enterobacteriaceae for susceptibility to a carbapenem should be performed whenever possible to ensure early detection of such strains. Current EUCAST and CLSI criteria correctly identified all of the isolates reported here as resistant to ertapenem. All isolates were also categorized as non-susceptible to both meropenem and imipenem by both sets of criteria. All isolates were resistant by current CLSI criteria, whereas nine and six isolates were classified as intermediate to meropenem and imipenem, respectively, by EUCAST criteria. The synergy disc test used in this study correctly identified KPC activity in all isolates; however, some carbapenemases, such as OXA-48, are associated with only a modest increase in carbapenem MIC and inhibitors of these enzymes have not been identified. It is thus not yet possible to identify production of all carbapenemases based solely on phenotypic methods. Therefore, evaluation for the presence of carbapenemase-encoding genes using molecular methods is optimal to confirm the presence of a carbapenemase. The KPC was first isolated from a CVC tip, but at that time represented colonization only. Subsequently, the isolate was recovered from a broncho-alveloar lavage and the patient was treated for ventilator-associated pneumonia with tigecycline, colistin and gentamicin.
Outbreak of KPC-2-producing K. pneumoniae The outbreak strain corresponds to the predominant KPC variant (KPC-2) and MLST type (ST258) reported elsewhere in Europe. 2 The correlation of clustering of PFGE patterns (at ≥88% in this study) with MLST type ST258 has previously been reported. 1 Stringent enforcement of IPC and antimicrobial stewardship measures appears to have been effective in termination of this specific outbreak. This is consistent with the report of Agodi et al. 15 that cleaning and disinfection of the ICU, segregation of affected patients, barrier nursing and strict compliance with hand hygiene procedures led to containment of an outbreak of KPC-3-producing K. pneumoniae.
However, the overall picture since 2009 suggests that KPC-2-producing K. pneumoniae is now endemic in this region of Ireland. As there is no established method for decolonization, there is likely to be a continuing risk of reintroduction of KPC-2-producing K. pneumoniae or other Enterobacteriaceae into the hospital that serves the endemic area and a continuing risk of extension to other regions by inter-hospital transfer. National guidelines advocate source isolation and screening of all inter-hospital transfers of patients with a history of admission to hospitals with an ongoing problem with CPE. 16 The risk of dissemination of CPE is magnified by the increasing dependence on the use of carbapenems for empirical therapy of critically ill patients related to a relatively high frequency of isolation of extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae. In response to the emergence of this and other CPE in Ireland, infection with such isolates is now notifiable to the Department of Public Health and a national study to establish the baseline prevalence of CPE in intensive care units has been performed. 17 In addition, interim national guidance on detection of and screening for CPE and IPC response have been prepared. 16 A national programme for antimicrobial stewardship and surveillance of hospital and community antimicrobial consumption is also in place. Although such measures may have contributed to substantial recent reductions in the proportion of Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infection accounted for by methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) in Ireland, we are not optimistic that it will be possible to effectively control or eradicate CPE. Antimicrobial resistance in Enterobacteriaceae is likely to be more difficult to control because: (i) screening based on rectal swabs is unlikely to identify all colonized patients efficiently, given the density and diversity of gastrointestinal flora; (ii) experience with ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae suggests that colonization, once established, may persist indefinitely; and (iii) there are no established protocols that are effective in decolonization. It is therefore likely that a national response incorporating IPC, antimicrobial stewardship and public health measures may, at best, delay dissemination of CPE. Since the onset of this outbreak a number of other CPE have emerged in a number of hospitals in other regions of Ireland, making effective control still more challenging.
